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Vertical Integration Incentives
in Meat Product Markets
Frances Antonovitz, Brian Buhr, and Donald J. Liu1
Since Tom Urban popularized the phrase "the Industrializa-
tion of Agriculture" nearly five years ago, numerous studies of
this phenomena have been conducted (e.g., Boehlje; Drabenstott;
and Hurt).  The industrialization of agriculture refers to the
trend toward larger production units (to capture economies of
scale) and the increasing occurrence of vertical integration and
coordination among the various stages of the food and fiber
system.  Barkema; Drabenstott; and Kinsey as well as others have
suggested that it is today's discriminating consumers who are the
driving force behind this industrialization because of their
demands for extremely detailed product specifications which have
overwhelmed the traditional market system.  This paper will focus
on the increased vertical integration and coordination occurring
in meat product markets.
To initially focus our comments, it is worthwhile to4
establish a stereotypical representation of the food production
system.  At the primary supply end of the chain is the farmer who
employs the four major factors of production (land, labor,
capital and equipment) to produce raw commodities such as corn
grain, live animals for slaughter, fruits, vegetables and
intermediate foods.  Next in line is the more heterogeneous (in
terms of inputs used and outputs produced) processing segment. 
One important characteristic of the processing sector is that
while always closer to the consumer than the producer, firms
within the industry may be relatively closer or farther from the
consumer.  For example, further cutting of meat products may be
done at the grocery store which is in direct contact with
consumers, while hamburgers used by McDonald's must clearly be
shipped to the restaurant.  Finally, there are the retail outlets
or more precisely the point of interface with the final consumer
who is the source of primary demand.  Along the way of course,
there are multiple suppliers involved in one sector and not
another and there are multiple leakages from one sector (e.g.
exports of chilled beef) and not another.  In between each sector
are marketing inputs and infrastructure including transportation,
grading systems, warehouses (perhaps rapidly becoming an
unnecessary storage factor) and price discovery institutions.
Each country possesses an agricultural and food sector which
fits this loosely defined structure.  However, each country's
conditions such as national policies (monetary, fiscal and
trade), and most importantly in our context endowments of various5
factors of production.  From a trade perspective, it is this
country specific portion of market conditions which may lead to a
firm seeking international vertical integration while eschewing
the same thing within its own country.
Historically, open spot markets for commodities have linked
together input suppliers, producers, processors, retailers, and
consumers.  Now, however, these open markets have been
increasingly replaced by vertical coordination, contractual
relationships, and vertical integration of two or more of these
stages.  Many of these arrangements even extend into
international markets.  Dairy production, seeds, commercial
fruits and vegetables, turkeys, eggs, and particularly broilers
have experienced some type of vertical coordination for quite a
long time.  However, contracting and integration are relatively
uncommon for grains, oilseeds, and cotton.  Relative newcomers to
the movement toward coordination include the beef and pork
industries.
More specifically, this study will attempt to apply some of
the relevant theories in industrial organization to the vertical
integration and coordination occurring in the livestock and meat
subsectors highlighted by domestic and international examples of
processed and fresh meats.  These subsectors are particularly
interesting because their "industrialization" has been rapidly
evolving (Hurt; Rhodes) and the markets have been moving quickly
toward coordinated agreements (Boehlje) and developing further
processed products at a remarkable rate.  Furthermore, for6
several reasons these subsectors represent some of the fastest
growing export markets in agriculture.  Improved technologies
allow perishable products to be transported abroad quickly and
easily.  Also, as incomes continue to rise in the newly
industrialized and emerging economies, we have seen and are
likely to continue to observe a significant increase in the
demand for meat in these countries with the U.S. having the
potential and motivation to fulfill these demands.  Hence, the
industries studied in this paper will provide a rich case history
for further studies assessing the hypotheses of vertical
integration for other domestic agricultural subsectors and for
vertical linkages in other international food markets as well.
Theory and Relevance
This section presents an overview of the relevant theories
of vertical integration and coordination and how these theories
can be used to examine the trend toward industrialization of the
meat sector, with particular focus on its international
dimension.  The discussion will include technological economies
arguments for vertical integration, neoclassical theories of
vertical integration, transaction cost economics viewpoints of
vertical integration, and theories of vertical contractual
relations.
Before proceeding with the overview, more precise
definitions of vertical integration and coordination are given. 7
      The Packer Consent Decree of 1920 forbad the "Big Five" 2
meat packers of that era from ownership of livestock and
subsequent meat products.  Current Midwestern corporate farm laws
often present explicit barriers to vertical integration (e.g.,
must be classified as a "family farm corporation").  An often
cited successful example of vertical integration in agriculture
is, of course, Tyson Foods.
Vertical integration is the consolidation of two successive
production processes in which the output of the upstream stage is
used as one intermediate input in the downstream stage.  The
consolidation is such that contractual and open market exchanges
between the upstream and downstream firms are eliminated and
replaced by internal exchanges within the consolidated firm.  As
such, vertical integration implies ownership and complete control
over neighboring stages of production or distribution.  Somewhere 
in between the extremes of vertical integration and open market
exchange lie the various degrees of vertical coordination arising
from contractual arrangements between firms at the successive
stages.  A vertical coordination transfers some (but not all) of
the production or distribution decisions of one firm to another.
Also, a general comment on the theory of vertical
integration is in order.  In reality the prevalent pattern of
agricultural industrialization is vertical coordination rather
than vertical integration.  Indeed, with few exceptions, vertical
integrations in agriculture are rare, and sometimes are not even
allowed by the law.   However, given that there are clear 2
examples in U.S. agriculture and that there are fewer legal8
barriers in international vertical integration this seems like a
reasonable way to proceed with the discussion.  By studying a
firm’s motivation for vertical integration, one gains insights
into the implication of existing vertical integration policies
(or lack thereof) on the conduct and performance of the industry. 
The investigation also places researchers in a better position to
predict the future of the industry if legal and economic
restrictions on vertical integration change.
Technological Economies Arguments
One reason given for the occurrence of vertical integration
is that there may be technological economies associated with the
integration because it takes less of the other intermediate
inputs to produce the same output in the downstream process
(Perry, 1989).  In processed meats a clear example is the
relationship between meat processors (defined as either
fabricating final cuts such as pork chops or processed meats such
as Johnsonville Brats) and grocery store butcher shops.  For all
practical purposes the technologies involved in the cutting and
packaging are identical.  Therefore, meat cutting personnel and
equipment would seem to be redundant inputs for one or the other
stage.  The primary practical reason for the lack of integration
is that individual grocery stores may attempt to satisfy their
particular customer's demands for specific cut specifications
(essentially a product differentiation argument).  Inventory9
control and product distribution may also be limiting factors in
further integration.  However, as meat products become more
homogeneous (due to producer and processor technologies) and
inventory control and information systems technologies improve,
it is likely that greater levels of integration will occur, most
likely with processors developing case ready products and the
retailer removing their redundant butcher shops.
Very intriguing cases arise when considering the
international dimensions of technological economies.  It is
readily apparent that technical efficiencies arise when livestock
and crop production can occur in the same place (linking
production to idiosyncratic country factor endowments) because it
is then possible to use the manure to improve crop yields and at
the same time reduce inputs associated with pollution abatement. 
This crop-livestock complementarity explains why it may be more
efficient for Japanese and Taiwanese packers and processors to
integrate backwardly into the livestock production stage in the
U.S., rather than importing feed grains from the U.S. and raising
the animals there.
Neoclassical Theories of Vertical Integration
In addition to technological economies, there are other
motivations for which firms integrate.  In the neoclassical
theory of vertical integration the focus has been on market
imperfections, including imperfect competition and imperfect10
        Subsequent researchers have raised the question of 3
whether vertical integration by the monopolistic manufacturer
information.
Imperfect Competition
Focusing on the case of imperfect competition, we will
examine three different motivations for vertical integration:
internalization of market distortions arising from imperfect
competition, price discrimination, and entry blocking.
Internalization of Efficiency Losses
Consider a vertical situation in which the upstream firm is
a monopoly which provides one of the intermediate inputs used by 
the downstream competitive firms.  Due to monopoly pricing, there
exists a distortion in the usage of intermediate inputs by the
downstream industry as firms shift away from the monopoly input
in favor of other intermediate inputs which are competitively
supplied.  The size of this distortion depends on the elasticity
of substitution among the inputs of downstream production.  The
monopoly would have the incentive to capture the efficiency loss
from the distortion by integrating forward into the downstream
stage (i.e., purchasing as many of the downstream firms as
possible), thus, expanding the usage of its own intermediate
good.  This suggests that one possible incentive for vertical
integration is to internalize efficiency losses arising from
imperfectly competitive pricing (e.g., McKenzie; and Vernon and
Graham).311
into the retail stage will in turn create a monopoly distortion
in that stage thus increasing consumer prices to such an extent
that it actually reduces overall welfare compared to the pre-
integration situation (see the review in Perry, 1989).
Just as monopoly pricing may cause inefficiencies, there are
clear distortions created at the international level by trade
policies such as non-tariff barriers.  Similar in concept to
avoiding monopoly distortions by vertically integrating, it may
be possible to capture or avoid some of the non-tariff trade
barrier distortions with international vertical integration.  An
example for incentives to integrate occurs within the context of
the European Community’s ban on beef imports from countries who
use certain anabolic hormones in production.  After processing,
it is not possible to tell which beef products are from treated
animals without expensive tests.  Therefore, all the beef from
countries which have approved use of the banned hormones is
effectively excluded from the E.C. whether it is treated or not. 
The only way to assure no use is for a firm in the E.C. to be
directly involved in raising the cattle itself and certify them
as hormone-free.  The U.S. firm IBP (a major beef packer) is
actively pursuing integrated marketing in the E.C. to ensure
hormone free beef, and personal contacts suggest they are
stepping up efforts in response to the recent BSE (mad cow
disease) incidents in Great Britain.
Another example that international vertical integration can
be used to circumvent non-tariff barriers is the following. 12
      Notice that the above scheme will not work if the 4
monopoly’s forward integration is with respect to the inelastic
Brazilian soybean producers may wish to capture value-added
production activity by feeding and exporting beef or pork to beef
or pork-deficit countries.  However, the export potential is
restricted because of foot-and-mouth disease in Brazil.  Hence,
there is an incentive for Brazilian soybean producers to ship the
beans to a disease-free country and vertically integrate into the
livestock production sector in that country.
Price Discrimination Motivations
  As pointed out in the literature (e.g., Stigler; and Perry,
1978a), another incentive for vertical integration under
imperfect competition is to separate downstream markets for the
purposes of price discrimination.  For example, consider the case
where an upstream monopoly is able to classify its downstream
competitive industries into two groups: one with an elastic
intermediate input demand for the monopoly product and the other
with an inelastic derived demand.  The Robinson-Patman Act
prohibits the monopoly from engaging in explicit price
discrimination, that is, charging a different price to each
downstream group.  Yet, through forwardly integrating into the
stages with elastic derived demand, the monopoly can expand input
usage for its product in those stages, meanwhile raising the open
market price to the inelastic group by charging the monopoly
price.413
group.  The optimal pricing strategy for the monopoly in this
case would appear, on the surface, to be to reduce the usage of
its product by the inelastic subsidiaries while lower the open
market price for the elastic independent firms.  But this cannot
be optimal because the resulting higher retail prices in the
inelastic stages would certainly be undercut by new entrants who
can obtain the monopoly input at the lower open market price.
Perry (1978b) gives an interesting backward-integration
story to illustrate the incentive for price discrimination by a
downstream monopsony.  To integrate back into the competitive
upstream industry, the monopsony needs to acquire the assets of
the competitive firms at the price which equals the rents that
the assets generate.  Instead of acquiring all of the upstream
firms outright, the monopsony can extract some of the initial
rents by buying one at a time.  More specifically, the partially
integrated monopsony then expands the production of its
subsidiaries, hence, buying even less from the remaining
independent firms.  In turn, this has the effect of lowering the
rents of the assets of the remaining independent suppliers which
makes it possible for the monopsonist to acquire those firms at a
lower price as it chooses to further integrate.
A good domestic market example of the above price-
discrimination theory is given by the meat packing and processing
industries.  As illustrated in Figure 1, after the slaughter
process, the carcass may move on to several alternative stages
which require different amounts of further processing (e.g.,
further cutting for consumption in the fresh market vs.14
additional processing such as canned hams, luncheon meats, etc.). 
If the demand elasticities are different for the fresh and the
more extensively processed meat products, then the theory can be
used to suggest which of the two processing stages the packer is
likely to choose for integration.  For example, Kesavan and Buhr
estimate that the retail demand for fresh cuts of pork (hams,
pork chops, and sirloin roasts) is less elastic than the demand
for pork sausage.  Based on the criteria of price discrimination,
if a packer chooses to integrate into one of these two processing
stages, it would pick the sausage.  This may be evidenced by the
fact that further processed sausages and canned hams in a typical
grocery store meat counter are branded by the packer or
processor, while most of the fresh cuts (pork chops, loins, etc.)
are typically store label.  One can make similar arguments at the
international level.  For example, if Country A’s demand for pork
sausage is less elastic than Country B’s, then the U.S. packing
firm would choose to integrate into the sausage processing stage
in Country B, ceteris paribus.
Entry Blocking Motivations
Bain proposes a third incentive for vertical integration
under imperfect competition.  He argues that vertical integration
has the effect of creating entry barriers by forcing potential
entrants to contemplate entry at two stages of production rather
than just one.  Salop and Scheffman discuss a situation where a15































































































































production stage so as to raise the costs of its downstream
competitors in the final good market.  More specifically, by
sufficiently integrating into the upstream stage and consequently
leaving the upstream open market thin, the final-good competitors
(existing or potential) are forced into a situation where they
find themselves not being able to expand without driving up the
input price significantly.
In a survey of U.S. pork packing industry (Hayenga et al.),
packers predict that their hog slaughter volume under vertical
integration or contracting with hog producers will increase from
13.4% of the total in 1993 to 33.9% in 1998.  The prediction of
increasing reliance on vertical integration and coordination can
be due to reasons other than entry blocking motives.  In any
case, the thinning of the open market leads economists to
hypothesize that fewer firms will be involved in pork packing in
the future.
We can also discuss the issue of entry barriers in the
context of resolving them.  Vertical integration can be used to
overcome barriers to entry into international markets.  For
example, Japanese meat wholesale companies have had a difficult
time acquiring particular pork products for their markets due to
different cultural preferences and the fact that the still
largely commodity mentality of U.S. meatpacking prevents U.S.
packers from meeting the Japanese demands.  To overcome this
factor, three Japanese firms (Mitsubishi, Central Soya and18
Ferruzzi) have purchased and operate IPC (a pork packing plant)
in Indiana with the explicit objective of procuring hogs and
processing them in a manner consistent with their meat sales in
Japan.  Hence, backward vertical integration in this case has
eliminated an institutional/cultural barrier of entry for
Japanese firms procuring pork products from the U.S. market.
The previous discussion centers on vertical integration
between a monopolistic stage and a neighboring competitive stage. 
Of course, vertical integration could also happen between two
successive stages each with a different degree of competition
among firms in the stage.  Many of the insights discussed above
remain valid.
Imperfect Information
Now, turn to the case of imperfect information.  We will
discuss several incentives for vertical integration under this
category including: supply assurance, diversification, and
information acquisition.
Supply Assurance Motivations
First, consider the notion of “supply assurance.”  As
pointed out by Perry (1989), this concept entails the possibility
of a rationing disequilibrium in the sense that the firm may not
be able to procure the desired quantity of input at the
prevailing open market price.  The salient feature of this
concept can be explained by Carlton’s model in which the upstream19
      In this example the supply is “rationed” by Mother 5
Nature.  That is, supply at any given point in time is fixed due
to biological lags in animal production.
manufacturers endogenously choose to ration the supply of the
necessary intermediate input to downstream retailers.  To ensure
adequate supplies of the input, the retailers have an incentive
to integrate back into the manufacturing stage, but only to the
extent that it guarantees the satisfaction of the portion of
consumer demand which will arise with high probability.  The
retailers then resort to the open market to buy additional
quantity of input called for by any greater consumer demand which
arises with low probability.
An example of this phenomena is the so-called captive-supply
of cattle.  Captive-supply refers to packers using contract
cattle, packer-owned cattle, or cattle procured via some type of
business arrangement (such as forward contracting) as a strategic
attempt to offset expected shortages during the year due to the
seasonality in the supply of cattle.   Clearly, captive-supply 5
may work to the benefit of packers by insuring a given supply of
cattle.  However, to the detriment of cattle producers, markets
may become thin (as pointed out earlier in the section on
imperfect competition and barriers to entry) and prices received
for fed cattle may be lower and/or market information is reduced
due to fewer reported price transactions established in the open
market (Barkley and Schroeder; and Ward et al.).20
      One can think of situations in which the foreign 6
distribution systems might choose to “ration” their net import
demand for the U.S. products.
We can also discuss the analogous concept of demand
assurance as it relates to international vertical integration. 
Interesting examples occur in the markets for red meat as well as
the market for broilers.  Animal anatomy dictates that specific
animal parts or cuts are produced in relatively fixed proportions
even though consumers may prefer one part or cut over another. 
In this country for example, consumers have an aversion toward
many of the offals or by-products of meat animals such as livers,
brains, kidneys, hearts, blood, and tongues.  However, the tastes
and preferences of consumers in the former Soviet Union and some
Asian countries are quite different; many of these offals and by-
products are as highly valued as the red meat itself (e.g., see
Hayes et al.; and Wong and Khan).  As to the broiler example,
U.S. consumers have a strong preference for breast meat while
this is not observed in many other countries.  Clearly, it is
optimal for the U.S. livestock and broiler industries to expand
their international markets into countries with stronger demand
for the parts or cuts not demanded in the U.S. market.  Foreign
captive demands for these parts or cuts can be established by
vertical integration into their retail distribution systems.   6
For example, Purdue and Cargill (U.S. broiler firms) have made
extensive in-roads towards integration in Russia and other former21
Soviet countries.  Recently (March 1996), Russia tried to
restrict chicken imports from the U.S. because it had argued that
U.S. imports did not meet its phytosanitary requirements. 
However, most market analysts agreed that this was an attempt to
protect their chicken producers and processors from the intense
competition from U.S. integrated firms.
Diversification Motivations
Can vertical integration be used as a tool to deal with
uncertainty arising from demand and supply shocks?  To provide a
partial answer, consider the model by Perry (1982).  Consumers
purchase the final good from retailers who in turn purchase the
good from an intermediate market supplied by manufacturers who in
turn obtain from the factor markets the inputs needed for the
production of the good.  There is also a foreign demand for the
good at the intermediate market level.  Through market linkages,
retail profits can be affected by shocks in consumer demand,
foreign demand and factor supply.  Now, suppose Retailer X and
Manufacturer Y are to be consolidated.  The integrated firm will
still be affected by economic elements affecting consumer demand
and factor supply.  Moreover, even though it may be no longer be
involved in the intermediate input market, the integrated firm is
not immune to shocks in foreign demand, as those shocks will
eventually affect factor and final output prices.  This suggests
that vertical integration will not inherently insulate firms from
economic shocks within the system.22
      The negative correlation result requires that the 7
elasticity of the retail demand for the final good exceeds the
elasticity of substitution among intermediate inputs used in
production of the final good.
Although vertical integration cannot insulate firms from
price fluctuations, it may provide the benefit of
diversification.  For example, when the shocks are mainly
fluctuations in foreign demand in the intermediate market
(increasing demand for the manufacturing stage, but reducing
supply and raising price for the retail stage), the returns from
retail and manufacturing stages are negatively correlated,  which 7
would present a diversification incentive for vertical
integration.  On the other hand, if the shocks are mainly
fluctuations in domestic demand (raising the demand in the same
direction of both stages), the returns from retail and
manufacturing operations are positively correlated and, hence,
the diversification incentive would favor disintegration!
A possible example of this phenomena occurred in the Fall of
1994 in the U.S. pork industry when packing plants had reached
their capacities near the peak of the hog cycle.  While the
capacity of the slaughter industry had been reached, the number
of market weight hogs continued to increase.  In this instance,
producers could not sell all of their hogs because of the
unanticipated oversupply of hogs relative to the capacity of the23
      Unlike seasonality of cattle production (discussed in 8
the context of captive supplies) which is easy to predict and
reflects more of a variation in supply rather than an
uncertainty, hog cycles (anywhere from 3 to 6 years) are
difficult to predict both in terms of timing and magnitude.
slaughter facilities.   Hence, while returns to hog producers 8
fell, the returns at the packer and retail levels did not. In
particular, the retail level viewed supply as unchanging when
capacity of the packers had been reached and retailers had no
incentive to lower prices as quantities were fixed at any rate.  
After this incident, many producers, and logically so, expressed
a desire to integrate or own packing plants themselves so as to
diversify their operations.  Even so, it's not clear there would
be extensive diversification benefits over the long run.
Information Acquisition Motivations
Given that firms operate under uncertainty, is it possible
that the reason they engage in vertical integrations is because
they want to acquire information relevant to the resolution of
the uncertainty?  Consider Arrow’s model in which there is a
group of competitive manufacturers supplying intermediate inputs
to a group of competitive retailers.  The intermediate input
price is stochastic because of production shocks associated with
the manufacturing stage.  While the production shocks are
observable by the upstream firms prior to the marketing of the
intermediate good, this information is not revealed to the
retailers until aggregated into the equilibrium price.  As such,24
      While being simple, as pointed out in Perry (1989), 9
Arrow’s model suffers a degeneracy problem of a sort.  That is,
since the manufacturers are competitive, they cannot benefit from
withholding their private information on production shocks and,
hence, the retailers could easily purchase the information from
them.  As such, vertical integration is not needed in the model. 
See Crocker for a model illustrating the acquisition of private
information while avoiding Arrow’s degeneracy.
the retailers have to make business decisions without knowing the
intermediate input price.  Obviously, if a retailer is to
integrate back into the manufacturing stage, he will be able to
observe the production shock of his subsidiary.  Assuming
production shocks are generally positively correlated across the
manufacturers, Arrow argues that backward integration facilitates
decision making as it enables the retailer to obtain a better
forecast of the intermediate input price.9
Additional insights on the information acquisition
motivation for vertical integration can be found in Rioran and
Sappington.  There are three vertical stages: R&D determining
output quality, manufacturing, and retailing.  The developer has
private information about the cost of R&D, while the manufacturer
(whose identity is to be determined) has private information
about the cost of producing the final good.  The retailer sells
the product at a known price.  Now, both the retailer and
developer can do the manufacturing and are equally proficient in
doing it.  The retailer’s problem is to decide whether to
manufacture the product himself or let the developer do it.  It
turns out that when R&D cost shock and production cost shock are25
positively correlated, the developer has an added incentive to
overstate the cost of R&D if he is also manufacturing.  Thus, it
is beneficial for the retailer in this case to vertically
integrate into the manufacturing stage.  On the other hand, when
the cost shocks are negatively correlated, the developer’s
incentive to overstate the cost of R&D is restrained if he is
also manufacturing.  Hence, it may be best for the retailer to
let the developer do the manufacturing.
Consider the following application and a slight variation of
Rioran and Sappington’s model in the area of export promotion. 
There are three vertical stages: Excel exporting beef to Japan,
advertising and promotion activities at the Japanese retail
level, and the Japanese retail stage.  The Japanese retailers
have private information about the cost of retailing, while the
promoter (whose identity is to be determined) has private
information about the cost of promotion.  Either Excel or the
Japanese retailers can perform the promotion activities.  Perhaps
the theory can be used to predict where the vertical integration
may occur.  If the retail cost shock and promotion cost shock are
positively correlated, the Japanese retailers have an added
incentive to overstate the cost of retailing if they are also
doing the promotion.  Thus, it is beneficial for Excel in this
case to vertically integrate into the export promotion stage.  On
the other hand, when the cost shocks are negatively correlated,
the retailers’ incentive to overstate the cost of retailing is26
restrained if they are also doing the promotion.  Hence, it may
be best for Excel to let the Japanese retailers do the promotion.
Finally, we would like to discuss an issue related to
information acquisition incentives to vertically integrate when
there is inaccuracy in the transmission process.  For example,
the production/processing/marketing system wants to produce meat
with characteristics that are highly valued by consumers. 
However, knowledge and understanding of consumers’ preferences
for individual characteristics must be accurately transmitted
through many disintegrated stages in the system to the genetics
and production management stages where most of the final product
characteristics are determined.  Hence, there may be some
incentive to shorten this information chain through vertical
integration so as to improve the accuracy and speed of
information transmission.  This also raises the issue of non-
identifiable product attributes which consumers may deem
important.  Organically produced meat and produce, rbST free
milk, and animal welfare friendly production methods are all
developments directly related to meeting specific consumer
preferences.  Many disintegrated sectors makes it difficult and
expensive to track these attributes which are only identifiable
by the labels placed on them once they leave their point of
production origin.  To ensure differentiation they must remain
outside the marketing channel of other products which could
easily make the same claim.  In addition, many of these products27
command market premiums providing incentives for intermediaries
to misrepresent the products.  These cases may in fact require
consumer cooperative ownership or integration of the production
process to "vouch for" the attendance of the desired attributes.
Transaction Cost Economics Viewpoints
Having discussed the neoclassical theories of vertical
integration, consideration now turns to the transaction cost
economics literature which focuses on vertical bilateral monopoly
exchanges (Coase; Williamson).  A bilateral monopoly between a
buyer and a seller of successive stages occurs because of
ownership of exchange-specific assets; a concept Williamson
referred to as “asset specificity”.  According to this theory,
vertical integration is merely one method of carrying out the
bilateral monopoly exchange, and there are other ways such as
contracting.  As the environment becomes more complex, however,
the probability of a contract failing to specify the terms of
performance for particular states of nature increases.  In such
states, due to asset specificity, a firm may find itself held
hostage by the other firm’s threat to relinquish the relationship
unless certain concessions are granted.  A solution to this
opportunistic behavior is vertical integration.  Obviously, the
stronger the asset specificity, the more opportunistic the other
party can be and, hence, the more preferable is the vertical
integration solution.  For a given degree of asset specificity,28
      PSE is a genetically-transmitted condition in which the 10
muscle tissue of the hog will react to stress before slaughter
diminishing its palatability.  Many foreign consumers have a much
stronger aversion to these characteristics (pale, soft, exudative
i.e., . PSE) than the average U.S. consumer.
the relative costs of governance between vertical integration and
contractual arrangement then dictates the choice of the
governance structure.
It is important to emphasize that transaction costs in
livestock industries has many applications such as grading,
quality of inputs, food safety, etc.  For example, consider PSE
syndrome in hogs.   PSE could be eradicated from the U.S. swine 10
herd as it has in Denmark.  However, at least in this country,
the costs of doing so would outweigh the benefits at the present
time because only a small proportion of hogs have this genetic
defect.  Since the Japanese have a strong presence for PSE-free
pork, they must carefully inspect each carcass imported from the
U.S. to insure that it does not have PSE.  Apparently, there are
significant transaction costs, to the Japanese, associated with
this type of nonintegrated bilateral arrangement.  Alternatively,
the Japanese could vertically integrate into the U.S. hog
production sector, produce PSE-free pork themselves, and ship it
back to Japan.
Theory of Vertical Coordination
It is clear that vertical integration gives the tightest
control among all the different types of vertical relationships. 29
However, the transaction cost economics literature suggests that 
there are situations in which a vertical coordination is
preferred depending on the relative cost of governance.  This
section provides a brief overview of the theory of vertical
coordination.
The literature here is mainly concerned with the contractual
relationship between two firms at successive stages of a vertical
chain.  While the actions of one firm affect the payoffs of the
other firm in the successive stage, each firm chooses its
decisions based solely on its own payoffs.  Hence, the thrust of
contract design problem is to overcome the externality between
the firms so that their joint payoffs are maximized and
distributed.  As such, the study of vertical contractual
relationships can be cast with the framework of principal-agent
problems.  One way to achieve this joint maximization is to solve
the principal-agent problem for the optimal actions and then draw
the contract accordingly.  The information needed for the
prescription and enforcement of such a contract, however, can be
so demanding that the contract is, in practice, either infeasible
or suboptimal.  In such a situation there are incentives to
utilize the various schemes of nonlinear pricing methods and
direct vertical restraints.
To illustrate the point, consider the simple example of
Katz, where there is only one principal with a single agent.  The30
principal is the manufacturer of an intermediate good which is
used with other inputs by the downstream agent to produce the
final retail good.  Assume that the manufacturer has all the 
bargaining power in that he is in a position to implement a
contract that induces the retailer to (i) behave in a manner
consistent with joint-profit maximization and (ii) submit all the
profits to the manufacturer.  Given the needed information, such
a contract can be drawn based on solutions to a corresponding
principal-agent problem.  But, is there an easier way?
Nonlinear Pricing
A two-part tariff is a simple pricing rule that enables the
manufacturer to accomplish the above two goals without getting
into a relationship requiring excessive post-contract monitoring. 
Under this contract, the retailer pays a franchise fee to the
manufacturer and then buys the intermediate good at its marginal
costs.  The franchise fee transfers rents to the manufacturer,
while marginal cost pricing for the intermediate good induces the
retailer to act as a joint-profit maximizer.  Note that the two-
part tariff scheme is a type of quantity-dependent pricing as the
average per-unit price falls with the purchase volume.
If a franchise fee is not allowed, the manufacturer would
have to set the price of the intermediate good above its marginal
costs to extract rents from the retailer.  However, a divergence
between marginal price and marginal costs distorts the retailer’s31
incentive for joint profit maximization.  Katz discusses other
situations in which the manufacturer would find it optimal to set
the marginal price above marginal costs (e.g., under various
situations of incomplete information).  The upshot is that when
the wholesale price of the intermediate good exceeds the marginal
cost, the retailer purchases too little of the intermediate good
because of (a) factor substitution in favor other inputs, and (b)
output contraction in response to higher costs.
Direct Vertical Restraints
To ameliorate distortions from above-marginal-cost pricing,
the manufacturer may wish to impose contract provisions for such
direct vertical restraints as ties, royalty, and resale price
maintenances.  For example, the manufacturer may mandate the use
of inputs in efficient proportions through the use of a tying
arrangement, which occurs when a seller agrees to sell input A to
a buyer only if the buyer also purchases input B from that seller
(and no other).  A tying arrangement works perfectly to overcome
input mix distortions only when it can be applied to all inputs,
and additional distortions may be induced if this is not the
case.  As pointed out by Katz, however, these distortions can be
minimized by increasing the prices of the tied inputs that are
the least substitutable for untied inputs.  Alternatively, the
manufacturer may adopt a royalty scheme where the retailer’s
payment for the intermediate input depends on his sales quantity32
        A tying arrangement is a multi-product pricing scheme 11
because the seller’s price for A is infinite if the quantity of B
purchased from another firm is positive.
or revenues in the final good market.  Similar to a tying
arrangement, a royalty can be thought of as a form of multi-
product pricing because it is equivalent to a proportional markup
on all inputs.   However, a royalty has the advantage over a tie 11
in that the manufacturer does not have to monitor the levels of
other intermediate inputs in order to limit input distortions. 
Finally, as to the distortion arising from output contraction, a
resale price maintenance can be employed.  Specifically, since
output contraction increases retail price, the manufacturer can
impose a resale price ceiling so as to constrain the extent to
which the retailer can reduce the output.  A potential problem
with this scheme is that the retailer may respond to the price
ceiling by reducing the quality of his output.
For pragmatic reasons, we have restricted ourselves in the
above discussion on vertical contractual relationship to the
simplified case where there is only one principal with one agent. 
The basic issue is how to deal with the externalities between the
two parties so that they will behave in a joint maximizing
manner.  We have found that the simple rule of marginal cost
pricing is conducive for inducing the agent to behave in a joint-
profit maximizing manner, while the taxation of a suitable
franchise fee can be used to distribute the joint profits in a33
manner consistent with the relative bargaining position of the
two parties.  In cases where there is a need for above-marginal-
cost pricing, direct vertical restraints can be used to alleviate
the resulting distortions on the agent’s incentive for joint
maximization.  Katz also discusses the more realistic situations
where there are multiple agents and/or multiple principals. 
Though the problems of externalities become much more involved in
those cases, the basic spirit of the solutions, in large part,
remains the same.
As indicated earlier, vertical contractual arrangements are
more common in most facets of agriculture and food than are
vertical integrations.  Current examples domestically include
contracting between hog producers and packers.  An interesting
characteristic of these contracts is that they do not allow
producers to market hogs outside the contract.  This ensures that
the potential externalities indicated by the previous literature
will not arise.  Feed companies are aggressively seeking
coordination with independent growers to capture markets for
their feed products.  They likely would not do so without
regulatory barriers (specifically corporate farm laws) to
ownership.
Summary and Implications for Future Research
Will the study of vertical integration and coordination in
agricultural markets be just a short-lived fad, like mini-skirts34
and tie-died tee shirts?  We think not.  Consumers here and
abroad are becoming more discriminating in their tastes and
demanding that more services be included in the food products
that they purchase.  Hence, this necessitates more precise
coordination among the stages of production and marketing. 
Furthermore, as production, processing, and transportation
technologies continue to evolve, international trade will
increase in perishable foods and lead to additional opportunities
and need for vertical integration across international
boundaries.  As incomes increase in the newly industrialized
countries and other emerging economies, the demand for meat will
increase at a greater rate than for many other foods.  All of
these factors point to more trade in fresh and processed meat and
more international vertical integration and coordination in the
markets for these products.
This paper presents an overview of the theories of vertical
integration and coordination and examines the relevancy of these
theories to the study of industrialization in the meat sector. 
Several broader research issues evolve from the paper.  As
discussed earlier, vertical integration and coordination can
allow an economy to recapture inefficiencies in the system while
at the same time creating additional distortions.  The question
is whether there is an overall gain or loss to the society. 
Furthermore, one must question whether the change in resulting
welfare distribution is an improvement over the previous state. 35
Obviously, the result of this evaluation depends on the welfare
criteria used.  In addition, we must put all of these debates in
a global context when international vertical integration arises. 
Clearly, issues of global welfare and distribution must be
examined as well as impacts on national food security, trade
patterns, and future direction of multinational trade
negotiations. 36
References
Arrow, K.J. “Vertical Integration and Communication.” Bell J.
Econ. 6(1975):173-83.
Barkema, A.  "New Roles and Alliances in the U.S. Food System." 
In Food and Agricultural Markets:  The Quiet Revolution. 
Schertz, L.P. and L.M. Daft, eds., Washington, D.C.: 
National Planning Association Report No. 270, 1994.
Barkley, A.P., and T.C. Schroeder. “The Role of Captive Supplies
in Beef Packing: Long-Run Impacts of Captive Supplies.” In
Reports to Packer & Stockyards Programs, Grain Inspection,
Packers and Stockyards Administration, USDA, 1995.
Bain, J.S. Barriers to New Competition. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press, 1956.
Boehlje, M. “Industrialization of Agriculture: What are the
Implications?” Choices, Fourth Quarter 1996:30-33.
Carlton, D.W. “Vertical Integration in Competitive Markets under
Uncertainty.” J. Industrial Econ. 27(1979):189-209.
Coase, R. “The Nature of the Firm.” Economica 4(1937):386-405.
Crocker, K.J. “Vertical Integration and the Strategic Use of
private Information.” Bell J. Econ. 14(1983):236-48.
Drabenstott, M. “Industrialization: Steady Current of Tidal
Wave.” Choices, Fourth Quarter 1994:4-8.37
Hayenga, M.L., V.J. Rhodes, G.A. Grimes, and J.D. Lawrence.
Vertical Coordination in Hog Production. Report to Packers &
Stockyard Programs, Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards
Administration, USDA, 1995.
Hayes, D., B. Chernyakov, and S. Sotnikov. Meat Marketing in the
Former USSR: A Guide for U.S. Meat Exporting Companies.
Midwest Agribusiness Trade Research and Information Center,
Iowa State University, 1993, pp. 12-14.
Hurt, C. “Industrialization of the Pork Industry.” Choices,
Fourth Quarter 1994:9-13.
Katz, M.L. “Vertical Contractual Relations.” In Handbook of
Industrial Organization, Vol. 1, eds. R. Schmalensee and R.
Willig, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1989, pp. 655-721.
Kesavan, T., and B. Buhr. “Price Determination and Dynamic
Adjustments: An Inverse Demand System Approach to Meat
Products in the United States.” Empirical Econ.
20(1995):681-98.
Kinsey, J.  "Changes in Food Consumption:  From Mass Market to
Niche Markets."  In Food and Agricultural Markets:  The
Quiet Revolution.  Schertz, L.P. and L.M. Daft, eds.,
Washington, D.C.:  National Planning Association Report No.
270, 1994.
McKenzie, L.W. “Ideal Output and the Interdependence of Firms.”
Econ. J. 61(1951):785-803.38
Perry, M.K. “Vertical Integration: Determinants and Effects.” In
Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. 1, eds. R.
Schmalensee and R. Willig, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1989,
pp. 183-255.
Perry, M.K. “Vertical Integration by Competitive Firms:
Uncertainty and diversification.” Southern Econ. J.
49(1982):201-08.
Perry, M.K. “Price Discrimination and Forward Integration.” Bell
J. Econ. 9(1978a):209-17.
Perry, M.K. “Vertical Integration: The Monopsony Case.” Amer.
Econ. Rev. 68(1978b):561-70.
Rhodes, V.J. “The Industrialization of Hog Production.”  Rev. of
Agr. Econ. 17(1995):107-118.
Riordan, M.H., and D.E.M. Sappington. “Information, Incentives
and Organizational Mode.” Quart. J. Econ. 102(1987):243-63.
Salop, S.C. and D.T. Scheffman. “Raising Rivals’ Costs.” Amer.
Econ. Rev. 73(1983):267-71.
Stigler, G.J. “The Division of Labor is Limited by the Extent of
the Market.” J. Polit. Econ. 59(1951):185-93.
Vernon, J. and D. Graham. “Profitability of Monopolization by
Vertical Integration.” J. Polit. Econ. 79(1971):924-25.
Urban, T. “Agricultural Industrialization: It’s Inevitable.”
Choices, Fourth Quarter (1991):4-6.39
Williamson, O.E. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust
Implications. New York:Free Press, 1975.
Ward, C.E., S.R. Koontz, and T.C. Schroeder. “Short-Run Captive
Supply Relationships with Fed Cattle Transaction Prices.” In
Reports to Packer & Stockyards Programs, Grain Inspection,
Packers and Stockyards Administration, USDA, 1995.
Wong, J., and L. Khan. “Meat Marketing in Taiwan.” In Meat
Marketing in Taiwan: A Guide for U.S. Meat Exporting
Companies, Hayes, D., ed., Midwest Agribusiness Trade
Research and Information Center, Iowa State University,
1989, pp. 94-98.